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Abstract  This  article  presents  a  review  of  the  literature  on  aspects  of  ﬁscal  and  ﬁnancial
crises. Firstly,  an  analysis  is  made  on  how  ﬁscal  policy  may  become  unsustainable,  whether  it
is due  to  a  worsening  of  the  fundamentals  of  a  country,  or  to  increasing  international  ﬁnancial
turmoil. Particular  attention  is  paid  to  the  literature  on  the  role  of  ﬁnancial  institutions  and
their sovereign  links  in  a  crisis  context.  This  link  may  mean  that  sovereign  stress  is  transferred
to the  banks,  via  holdings  of  sovereign  debt  or  vice  versa,  on  account  of  the  implicit  (or  explicit)
guarantee  that  banks  may  have  from  the  sovereign.  Secondly,  a  review  is  made  of  the  determin-
ing factors  of  the  connectedness  amongst  ﬁnancial  institutions  and  between  sovereign  banks.
The indicators  of  connectedness  can  help  understand  how  systemic  risk  builds  up.  Finally,  an
analysis is  made  on  how  the  debate  on  macro-prudential  policy  has  evolved  to  tackle  the  issue
of system-wide  ﬁnancial  stress.
©  2016  Asociacio´n  Cuadernos  de  Economı´a.  Published  by  Elsevier  Espan˜a,  S.L.U.  All  rights
reserved.
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La  literatura  sobre  la  interacción  del  riesgo  ﬁscal  y  la  estabilidad  ﬁnanciera:
una  revisión
Resumen  Este  artículo  repasa  la  literatura  académica  sobre  crisis  ﬁscales  y  ﬁnancieras.  En
mo  la  política  ﬁscal  de  un  país  puede  acabar  siendo  insostenible,
 los  fundamentales  del  país  o  por  un  aumento  de  las  turbulencias
.  Prestamos  especial  atención  a  la  literatura  sobre  el  papel  de  las
u  vinculación  con  el  soberano  en  un  contexto  de  crisis.  Este  vínculo
és  del  soberano  se  traslade  a  las  entidades  ﬁnancieras  mediante  las
os.  La  dirección  de  la  transmisión  del  riesgo  puede  ser  también  laPALABRAS  CLAVE
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Macroprudencial;
Crisis  ﬁnancieras;
Deuda  soberana
primer lugar,  se  analiza  có
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ﬁnancieras  internacionales
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contraria,  debido  a  la  garantía  que  ejerce  el  soberano  sobre  las  entidades  ﬁnancieras  de  su  país.
Asimismo,  se  repasa  la  literatura  sobre  la  conectividad  de  instituciones  ﬁnanciares  entre  sí  y
entre bancos  y  soberanos.  Los  indicadores  permiten  comprender  cómo  surge  el  riesgo  sistémico.
Finalmente,  analizamos  cómo  el  debate  sobre  la  política  macroprudencial  ha  evolucionado  en
los últimos  tiempos.
©  2016  Asociacio´n  Cuadernos  de  Economı´a.  Publicado  por  Elsevier  Espan˜a,  S.L.U.  Todos  los
derechos reservados.
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t. Introduction
his  survey  analyses  the  literature  on  the  interaction
etween  ﬁscal  risk  and  ﬁnancial  risk.  The  issue  has  gained
rominence  in  the  recent  crisis,  as  the  combination  of  a
eterioration  of  the  credit  quality  of  sovereigns  and  a  credit
runch  led  to  heightened  ﬁnancial  fragmentation  and  deep-
ned  the  downturn  in  stress  countries.
The  relationship  between  ﬁscal  policy,  debt  sustainability
nd  ﬁnancial  crises  has  been  around  for  a  long  time.  In  the
980s,  the  key  mechanism  for  developing  a  ﬁnancial  crisis
as  through  unsustainable  ﬁscal  policies  that  would  lead  to
onetary  ﬁnancing,  and  so,  an  unsustainable  exchange  rate
Flood  and  Marion,  1998).  The  seminal  papers  on  the  gov-
rnment’s  intertemporal  budget  constraint  are  part  of  this
trand  of  literature  (Trehan  and  Walsh,  1988).
This  survey  analyzes  ﬁrst  the  literature  on  ﬁscal  sus-
ainability,  from  the  perspective  of  the  formulation  of
scal  policy.  Second,  we  study  the  interaction  between  the
scal  balance  and  the  cycle,  and  the  role  of  institutions.
owever,  ﬁscal  policy  does  not  always  hold  the  key  for  the
ustainability  of  debt.  In  the  third  section,  we  study
he  role  played  by  sovereign  spreads:  an  increase  in  the
ost  of  ﬁnance  can  worsen  ﬁscal  sustainability.  This  could
e  due  to  exogenous  factors,  not  related  to  the  ﬁscal
olicy.  Also,  the  role  played  by  the  banking  sector  is  studied
n  the  following  section.  Finally,  we  study  the  role  of
acro-prudential  policy  in  addressing  the  build-up  risk  both
ithin  the  ﬁnancial  sector  and  the  interactions  of  this  risk
ith  sovereign  risk.
The  survey  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  1  reviews  the
iterature  on  ﬁscal  sustainability,  from  the  perspective  of
he  formulation  of  ﬁscal  policy.  In  Section  2,  we  study
he  interaction  between  the  ﬁscal  balance  and  the  busi-
ess  cycle,  the  role  of  institutions,  sovereign  spreads
nd  the  banking  sector.  Section  3  analyses  the  role  of
acro-prudential  policy  in  addressing  the  build-up  risk  both
ithin  the  ﬁnancial  sector  and  the  interactions  of  this  risk
ith  sovereign  risk.  Finally,  in  Section  4,  some  concluding
emarks  are  offered.
. Fiscal sustainability: main aspectsohn  (1998)  analyzed  whether  ﬁscal  policy  in  the  US  was
ustainable,  in  the  sense  that  it  reacts  to  an  economic  shock
hat  raises  the  debt  to  Gross  Domestic  Product  (GDP)  ratio
y  increasing  its  primary  balance,  which  would  eventually
d
a
ctabilize  debt.  A  large  part  of  the  literature  that  has
xamined  the  issue  is  empirical.
Several  studies  have  addressed  this  question  via  sin-
le  country  analysis  (Bohn,  2008) and  panel  analysis,  while
thers,  employ  a  Vector  Autoregressive  (VAR)  approach.  In
eneral,  for  developed  countries,  the  literature  ﬁnds  that
he  primary  balance  reacts  positively  to  an  increase  in  the
ebt-GDP  ratio.
Much  of  the  literature  deals  with  country  or  region-
peciﬁc  ﬁscal  response  functions.  For  instance,  Ballabriga
nd  Martinez-Mongay  (2005)  show  that  primary  balances
ncrease  as  a  response  to  higher  government  debt  in  the
uropean  Union  (EU).
Bohn’s  (1998)  paper  showed  that  the  reaction  of  the
rimary  balance  to  a  rise  in  government  debt  could  be  con-
idered  an  indicator  of  the  sustainability  of  the  ﬁscal  stance.
f  an  economic  shock  that  leads  to  an  increase  in  the  debt
tock  is  followed  by  a  strengthening  of  the  primary  balance,
scal  policy  can  be  deemed  sustainable.
Bohn  (1998)  results  go  in  line  with  the  ﬁnding  in  later
esearch  regarding  developed  countries;  he  ﬁnds  that  ﬁs-
al  policy  in  the  United  States  of  America  (USA)  in  the  20th
entury  reacted  positively  to  rises  in  public  debt,  and  so  con-
ludes  that  ﬁscal  policy  was,  by  that  measure,  sustainable.
Several  authors  have  used  the  same  methodology  for
uropean  countries,  see  for  instance  Wyplosz  (2006)  and
taehr  (2008). Piergallini  and  Postigliola  (2012)  use  the
ethodology  for  Italy  and  De  Mello  (2008)  for  Brazil.  They
ll  ﬁnd  that  ﬁscal  policy  reacted  responsibly,  in  that  it  rose
n  response  to  an  increase  in  debt.
.1.  Fiscal  policy  and  the  business  cycle
ne  of  the  main  determinants  of  ﬁscal  policy  is  the  busi-
ess  cycle.  A  classic  result  of  this  literature  has  been
hat  ﬁscal  policy  usually  is  counter-cyclical  in  developed
conomies,  while  it  is  pro-cyclical  in  emerging  economies
Afonso,  2008).  Staehr  (2008)  ﬁnds  a  similar  result  within
urope;  according  to  his  paper,  ﬁscal  policy  is  much  more
nti-cyclical  in  Western  Europe  than  in  Eastern  Europe.
Égert  (2014)  conﬁrms  that  ﬁscal  policy  is  counter-cyclical
n  the  Organisation  for  Economic  Co-operation  and  Develop-
ent  (OECD),  although  this  is  less  clear  in  the  case  of  highly
ndebted  countries.  Similarly,  others  ﬁnd  that  the  size  of
he  counter-cyclical  response  of  discretionary  ﬁscal  policy
epends  on  the  initial  ﬁscal  stance  and  debt  level.
According  to  Wyplosz  (2006), the  cyclically  adjusted  bal-
nce  reacted  more  strongly  to  the  business  cycle  before  the
ountries  entered  the  euro  area  than  afterwards,  while  the
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discretionary  component  was  pro-cyclical  prior  to  entry,  as
countries  tried  to  meet  the  accession  criteria,  but  became
a-cyclical  once  countries  joined  the  single  currency.
Others  argue  that  to  the  extent  that  tax  revenues  have
a  cyclical  component,  this  introduces  an  automatic  co-
movement  between  government  balances  and  the  business
cycle.  As  a  result,  the  pro-cyclicality  ﬁnding  for  develop-
ing  countries  may  not  reﬂect  policy  intentions  but  rather
the  fact  that  the  structure  of  tax  revenues  is  more  cyclical
there.  They  use  a  component  analysis,  looking  at  govern-
ment  consumption  and  revenues  and  correcting  for  the  fact
that  tax  revenues  are  endogenous  to  the  business  cycle  by
using  tax  rates  as  instruments.  They  conclude  that  ﬁscal  pol-
icy  in  emerging  economies  is  less  pro-cyclical  than  had  been
found  earlier.
Afonso  (2008),  using  an  EU  panel,  ﬁnds  a  counter-cyclical
response  of  ﬁscal  policy,  with  the  primary  balance  improv-
ing  with  increases  in  the  output  gap.  He  also  highlights  that
electoral  budget  cycles  play  a  role  in  the  determination  of
ﬁscal  policy.
Other  studies  have  found  that  the  reaction  to  the
business  cycle  is  often  asymmetric  while  counter-cyclical
in  downturns;  it  is  either  a-cyclical  or  mildly  pro-cyclical  in
upswings.  As  a  result,  debt  accumulated  during  downturns
is  not  fully  paid  back  during  good  times  (see  e.g.,  Lee  and
Sung,  2007;  Leigh  and  Stehn,  2009).
Many  empirical  studies  have  looked  at  the  cyclical  co-
movements  of  ﬁscal  variables  in  industrial  and  developing
countries,  such  as  Alesina  and  Tabellini  (2005), Gavin  and
Perotti  (1997),  Kaminsky  et  al.  (2004)  or  Talvi  and  Vegh
(2005).  These  studies  document  that  primary  balances  are
counter-cyclical  in  developed  countries,  and  tend  to  be
more  pro-cyclical  in  developing  countries  (Mendoza  and
Ostry,  2008).
2.2.  Taking  into  account  government  decisions
Alternatively,  ﬁscal  reaction  functions  can  be  understood  as
a  problem  where  policymakers  minimize  a  loss  function  sub-
ject  to  constraints  afforded  by  the  economy,  such  as  the
reaction  of  other  agents  (the  private  sector)  to  different
government  policies.  The  key  issue  then  is  to  determine
whether  the  change  in  the  ﬁscal  balance  triggered  by  debt
or  another  event  is  intentional.
One  aspect  to  take  into  account  when  assessing  govern-
ment’s  policy  intentions  is  the  existence  of  persistence,  over
time,  in  the  ﬁscal  balance.  This  persistence  component  may
be  due  to  rigidities  in  the  budget  procedures,  for  instance
stemming  from  the  fact  that  part  of  a  government’s  spend-
ing  in  a  given  year  has  been  pre-committed.  This  seems  to
be  greater  in  advanced  economies  (Fatas  and  Mihov,  2001,
2008).  Paloviita  (2012)  ﬁnds  that  persistence  has  been  lower
in  the  peripheral  countries  than  in  the  rest  of  the  euro  area.
According  to  Afonso  and  Furceri  (2010),  persistence  is  deter-
mined  by  country  income  and  public  sector  size.
In  order  to  test  for  the  importance  of  the  government’s
intentions,  as  opposed  to  realized  outcomes  that  may  be
affected  by  contemporaneous  shocks  to  the  economy,  a  part
of  the  literature  has  distinguished  between  planned  and
realized  ﬁscal  balances,  using  the  former  as  an  indicator
of  government  intentions.
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Some  studies  do  this  by  isolating  variables  that  reﬂect
olicy  decisions  such  as  tax  rates  or  discretionary  spending
ategories  (Ilzetzki  and  Vegh,  2008;  Darvas,  2010).  Others
se  real-time  data  to  provide  a  more  realistic  picture  of
scal  policy-making  (e.g.  Bernoth  and  Wolff,  2008).
.3.  Discretionary  ﬁscal  policy  and  automatic
tabilizers
n  order  to  obtain  a  measure  of  government’s  policy  inten-
ions,  the  cyclical  component  must  be  removed  from  tax
evenue  and  primary  spending  items,  thus  obtaining  the
yclically  adjusted  primary  balance.  One  approach  consists
n  regressing  the  ﬁscal  policy  variable  on  a  measure  of  the
usiness  cycle  and  to  interpret  the  residuals  as  the  discre-
ionary  policy  component.  For  instance,  Fatas  and  Mihov
2003)  use  this  approach  and  ﬁnd  that  the  residuals  of  the
scal  policy  reaction  functions  of  euro  area  countries  dimin-
shed  over  time,  indicating  less  reliance  on  discretionary
scal  policy  in  the  run  up  to  entry  into  the  Eurozone.
This  strategy  was  criticized  by  Galí  and  Perotti  (2003);
n  their  view,  this  only  captured  the  non-systematic  part
f  discretionary  policy.  Instead,  using  cyclically  adjusted
pending  and  revenue  by  category  (Giorno  et  al.,  1995;
ndré  and  Girouard,  2005)  would  provide  a  more  reliable
verall  picture  of  the  ﬁscal  policy  stance.  In  line  with  the
esults  mentioned  earlier,  they  conclude  that  discretionary
scal  policy  became  more  counter-cyclical  in  the  1990s  in
ost  advanced  countries.  He  discovers  that  the  introduction
f  the  euro  led  member  countries  to  use  a  more  counter-
yclical  policy.
Fatas  and  Mihov  (2009)  notice  that  discretionary  policy
as  slightly  pro-cyclical  in  the  euro  area  countries,  while
he  United  States  pursued  a  strongly  counter-cyclical  dis-
retionary  policy.  Auerbach  (2009)  conﬁrms  their  result,  and
nds  that  ﬁscal  policy  in  the  US  was  counter-cyclical.  In  his
tudy,  this  result  holds  for  both  the  expenditure  and  revenue
ide  for  a  long  time  period  (between  1984  and  2009).  He
uggests  that  spending  responded  more  strongly  than  rev-
nues.  In  contrast,  the  automatic  stabilizers  are  found  to
eact  more  strongly  to  the  business  cycle  in  the  euro  area
han  in  the  United  States.
Some  authors  show  that  discretionary  ﬁscal  policy  inten-
ions  are  counter-cyclical  in  OECD  countries,  especially
uring  expansions,  by  looking  at  ex-ante  forecasts  of  cycli-
ally  adjusted  primary  government  balances.  He  also  shows
hat  the  outcome  of  discretionary  ﬁscal  policy  is  pro-cyclical
x  post.  Beetsma  et  al.  (2008)  ﬁnd  that  planned  ﬁscal  policy
s  counter-cyclical  in  non-EU  OECD  countries  while  it  is  a-
yclical  in  EU  countries.  Bernoth  and  Wolff  (2008)  show  for
uro  area  countries  that  ﬁscal  policy  is  usually  planned  to  be
ounter-cyclical,  but  biases  in  the  execution  of  planned  poli-
ies  lead  the  ﬁscal  stance  to  become  pro-cyclical.  Golinelli
nd  Momigliano  (2009)  point  out  that  the  results  reported
bove  are  sensitive  to  robustness  checks,  such  as  alternative
easures  of  the  output  gap;  in  their  setting,  the  ﬁnding  that
scal  policy  plans  in  the  euro  area  are  more  counter-cyclical
han  ﬁnal  outcomes  still  holds.
Jaimovich  and  Panizza  (2007)  use  foreign  partners’  GDP
rowth  as  an  instrument  of  the  domestic  business  cycle,
iven  the  feedback  loops  between  ﬁscal  policy  and  the
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usiness  cycle.  Their  result  overthrows  the  ﬁnding  of  a
ro-cyclical  ﬁscal  policy  for  developing  countries.  Ilzetzki
nd  Vegh  (2008)  assess  the  robustness  of  the  ﬁnding  that
eveloping  countries  pursue  pro-cyclical  ﬁscal  policies  while
eveloped  OECD  countries  are  less  pro-cyclical  or  a-cyclical
y  controlling  for  endogeneity  of  the  business  cycle  vari-
ble  through  various  methods  (instrumental  variables  (IV),
eneralized  method  of  moments  (GMM),  simultaneous  equa-
ions  and  VAR  models).  Lee  and  Sung  (2007),  by  also  using  an
V  approach  also  ﬁnd  that  government  spending  is  strongly
ounter-cyclical  in  most  OECD  economies,  with  a  few  a-
yclical  exceptions.
Strawczynski  and  Zeira  (2009)  take  a  different  perspec-
ive  and  analyze  the  reaction  of  ﬁscal  policy  to  temporary
nd  permanent  output  shocks  rather  than  to  cyclical  ﬂuctu-
tions.  They  show  that  the  reaction  of  general  government
eﬁcits  and  spending  to  a  temporary  output  shock  is  counter-
yclical.  However,  the  reaction  to  a  permanent  shock  is
-cyclical.
Based  on  an  event  study  approach,  Leigh  and  Stehn  (2009)
rgue  that  the  Group  of  Seven  (G7)  countries  eased  discre-
ionary  ﬁscal  policy  during  downturns  in  a  timely  manner  on
 number  of  occasions.  Nevertheless,  they  also  show  that
scal  policy  in  non-Eurozone  countries  responded  quicker
nd  more  often  to  downturns  than  in  Eurozone  members
f  the  G7.  A  further  difference  between  the  Eurozone  and
ther  countries  is  that  discretionary  ﬁscal  easing  occurs
ore  often  during  economic  recoveries  in  the  former  than
n  the  latter.
.4.  Political  economy  and  ﬁscal  policy
olinelli  and  Momigliano  (2009)  report  similar  results  for
hose  countries  before  the  adoption  of  the  euro.  Elections
eem  to  inﬂuence  general  government  balances  in  other
ECD  countries  over  longer  periods  as  well  while  govern-
ent  spending  is  not  found  to  be  inﬂuenced  by  electoral
ycles  (Strawczynski  and  Zeira,  2009).  The  main  speciﬁ-
ation  in  Afonso  and  Hauptmeier  (2009)  also  shows  that
lections  are  associated  with  a  deterioration  in  primary  gov-
rnment  balances.  Nevertheless,  their  result  is  not  robust
o  alternative  model  speciﬁcations  in  which  the  coefﬁcients
ither  switch  sign  or  become  insigniﬁcant.
.5.  Cyclicality  of  the  components
ee  and  Sung  (2007)  report  that  total  government  revenues
f  OECD  economies  are  counter-cyclical  with  respect  to  GDP
rowth  and  total  government  expenditure  is  mildly  pro-
yclical.  At  a  higher  level  of  disaggregation,  current  and
apital  expenditure  and  subsidies  and  transfers  are  found  to
e  a-cyclical.  On  the  revenue  side,  income  and  commodity
axes  react  counter-cyclically  whereas  social  security  con-
ributions  appear  insensitive  to  the  business  cycle.
Lane  (2003)  shows  that  the  cyclical  behavior  of  overall
overnment  spending  in  OECD  countries  hides  a  heteroge-
eous  response  of  the  different  spending  components  to  the
usiness  cycle.  While  public  transfers  and  debt  interest  pay-
ents  are  counter-cyclical,  current  spending  is  pro-cyclical
nd  government  investment  is  pro-cyclical.  In  particular,
overnment  wages  are  more  pro-cyclical  than  non-wage
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overnment  consumption  whereas  government  employment
s  a-cyclical.  The  cross-country  variation  in  cyclical  reactions
s  mostly  explained  by  output  volatility  and  institutional
ariables,  in  particular  weak  government  support.  Public
ector  wages  are  the  main  channel  through  which  higher
utput  volatility  and  lower  government  support  lead  to  more
ro-cyclicality  in  government  spending.
.6.  Debt  sustainability:  the  ﬁscal  limit
he  relationship  between  the  ﬁscal  reaction  function  and
ebt  sustainability  was  originally  related  to  the  debate  on
he  interactions  between  monetary  and  ﬁscal  policy.  Leeper
2013)  postulated  that  to  the  extent  that  governments  issue
ubstantial  debt,  when  such  economies  are  approaching
heir  ﬁscal  limits,  debt  can  be  devalued  through  higher  inﬂa-
ion.  Based  on  this  insight,  he  develops  a  model  that  suggests
hat  the  source  of  inﬂation  is  ﬁscal  policy.  Once  the  ﬁscal
imit  is  approached,  the  government  must  ﬁnance  its  deﬁcit
y  printing  money.  These  dynamics  may  lead  to  episodes  of
yperinﬂation.
As  a  result  of  his  contribution,  a  body  of  the  literature
nalyzed  how  the  ﬁscal  limit  could  be  determined.  In  Bi
2012), the  ﬁscal  limit  depends  mainly  on  the  size  of  the
overnment,  the  degree  of  counter-cyclicality  of  the  pol-
cy  responses,  economic  diversity,  and  political  uncertainty.
hey  justify  non-linearities  in  the  behavior  of  sovereign  risk
remia;  once  they  are  on  the  rise,  they  rise  quickly.  This,  in
urn,  justiﬁes  the  non-linearities  in  ﬁscal  adjustment;  little
djustment  is  carried  out  at  low  levels  of  debt,  when  the
ost  of  additional  adjustment  does  not  seem  to  be  justiﬁed,
nd  then  a  rapid  adjustment  as  the  debt  limit  is  approached.
.7.  The  determinants  of  sustainability:  sovereign
preads
or  all  the  importance  of  the  determinants  of  the  primary
alance,  and  the  determinants  of  debt  sustainability  from
undamentals,  a  body  of  the  literature  has  found  that  risk
remia  are  often  determined  by  factors  not  related  to  ﬁs-
al  fundamentals.  To  the  extent  that  adverse  shocks,  not
elated  to  a given  country’s  ﬁscal  policy,  can  lead  to  shocks
n  the  sovereign  premia,  and  so  alter  debt  sustainability
ynamics,  this  can  be  thought  of  as  a  case  of  the  interac-
ion  between  ﬁnancial  markets  and  ﬁscal  policy,  and  how
he  former  can  impact  debt  sustainability,  even  if  the  ﬁscal
olicy  stance  (and,  possibly,  the  underlying  macro-economic
onditions)  remains  unchanged.
Sovereign  spread  determinants  are  typically  decomposed
nto  the  default  risk  (which  is  dependent  on  the  assessment
f  the  ﬁscal  health  of  a  given  sovereign)  and  risk  aversion,
hich  tends  to  be  related  to  market  perception  not  related
o  actual  debt  sustainability  dynamics  of  a  given  country.
overeign  risk  can  also  be  measured  by  sovereign  credit  rat-
ngs,  credit  default  swap  (CDS)  premia  and  other  rankings
f  the  country  risk  or  sovereign  creditworthiness.  At  ﬁrst,
his  literature  focused  on  emerging  economies,  in  particu-
ar  following  the  1980s.  However,  the  advent  of  the  Euro,
nd  in  particular  the  euro  sovereign  debt  crisis,  brought
bout  renewed  attention  to  the  issue  from  the  perspective
f  developed  countries.
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2.7.1.  Studies  on  emerging  countries
Min  (1998)  ﬁnds  that  for  the  early  90s  there  is  a  positive  and
signiﬁcant  effect  of  debt  to  GDP,  debt  service  to  exports,
net  foreign  assets,  exports  growth,  the  real  exchange  rate,
and  inﬂation  on  one  side,  and  negative  effects  of  the  terms
of  trade,  foreign  exchange  reserves  to  GDP,  maturity  and
imports  growth  on  sovereign  spreads.
Eichengreen  and  Mody  (1998)  conclude  that  a  higher  ratio
of  debt  service  to  exports  is  associated  with  higher  bond
spreads.  They  also  show  the  negative  signiﬁcance  of  the  GDP
growth  rate,  the  issue  size  and  the  residual  of  a  regression
of  the  credit  rating  from  fundamentals.  The  latter  is  one  of
the  pioneering  efforts  to  capture  issues  that  are  not  related
to  country-speciﬁc  macro-fundamentals.
Much  like  Edwards  (1986)  and  Min  (1998),  Eichengreen
and  Mody  (1998)  do  not  control  for  global  risk  aversion  indi-
vidually  as  opposed  to  variables  that  relate  to  the  state  of
world  ﬁnancial  markets.  In  the  early  stages  of  this  literature,
the  main  concern  seemed  to  be  which  fundamentals  were
better  determinants  of  sovereign  spreads,  rather  than  the
interactions  between  sovereign  stress  and  ﬁnancial  markets.
Arora  and  Cerisola  (2000)  estimate  the  determinants  of
secondary  market  sovereign  bond  spreads  for  a  sample  of
11  large  emerging  countries  in  1994--1999.  They  ﬁnd  a  posi-
tive  impact  of  the  short-term  US  interest  rate  and  of  market
volatility  on  spreads  across  all  countries,  in  what  can  be
considered  a  proxy  for  the  effect  of  global  risk  aversion.
Also,  spreads  are  in  large  part  explained  by  country-speciﬁc
fundamentals,  pertaining  in  particular  to  the  external  and
ﬁscal  position.  They  ﬁnd  that  a  signiﬁcant  impact  of  the
net  foreign  asset  position,  lower  ﬁscal  deﬁcits  and  lower
ratios  of  debt  service  to  exports  and  debt  service  to  GDP
help  decrease  sovereign  spreads.
Aronovich  (1999)  uses  daily  data  on  sovereign  spreads  to
assess  the  determinants  in  the  1997--1998  period  for  three
large  Latin  American  countries.  These  are  the  implicit  prob-
ability  of  default  and  the  30-year  USTB  rate,  where  the
latter  is  used  as  a  proxy  of  an  exogenous  change  in  global
ﬁnancial  conditions.
2.7.2.  Contagion  and  spreads
Baig  and  Goldfajn  (2000)  test  whether  there  was  contagion
from  the  Russian  crisis  to  Brazil  in  the  late  1990s.  They  ﬁnd
evidence  supporting  the  contagion  hypothesis  and  report  a
negative  impact  of  the  long-term  American  interest  rate  on
spreads.  Nogués  and  Grandes  (2001)  also  ﬁnd  a  negative
effect  on  sovereign  spreads  for  Argentina  in  the  late  1990s.
In  their  paper,  there  is  evidence  of  not  only  contagion  but
also  of  the  relevance  of  country-speciﬁc  factors,  like  ﬁscal
deﬁcits,  GDP  growth,  the  debt  service  to  exports  ratio,  and
institutional  priorities.
Ferrucci  (2003)  investigates  the  empirical  relationship
between  emerging  market  sovereign  spreads  and  a  set
of  common  macro-economic  fundamentals,  using  Emerging
Markets  Bonds  Index  (EMBI  spreads  over  the  period  Decem-
ber  1991--March  2003).  The  estimation  technique  posits
a  dynamic  error  correction  model  that  allows  short-run
parameters  to  vary  across  groups,  while  restricting  long-
run  elasticities.  Their  results  point  to  markets  pricing  in
macro-conditions  in  sovereign  risk.  In  particular,  indicators
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ike  external  debt,  openness  and  current  account  balance
ffect  the  pricing  of  sovereign  spreads.
However,  non-fundamental  factors  like  global  liquidity
onditions  and  US  equity  prices  also  play  a  role.  This  result
s  obtained  by  controlling  for  global  risk  aversion  by  using
he  spread  between  low-  and  high-rating  US  corporate  bonds
nd  ﬁnds  a  negative  impact  on  emerging  market  sovereign
preads;  higher  junk  bond  spreads  lead  to  lower  emerging
arket  spreads.
González-Rozada  and  Yeyati  (2008)  analyze  the  impact
f  interest  rates  of  bonds  issued  by  developed  countries  on
merging  market  spreads  in  1993--2005.  They  ﬁnd  that  a
arge  part  of  the  emerging  market  bond  spreads  is  explained
y  global  factors  like  risk  appetite  (the  spread  of  high  yield
orporate  bonds  in  developed  markets),  global  liquidity  and
ontagion  from  other  ﬁnancial  crises.  The  link  between
merging  country  spreads  and  global  factors  is  shown  to
emain  relatively  stable  since  1993.  This  ﬁnding  is  robust
o  the  inclusion  of  country-speciﬁc  factors,  asymmetries,
lternative  risk  appetite  indicators  or  adjusted  ratings,  and
elps  provide  accurate  long-run  predictions.  Overall,  the
esults  highlight  the  critical  role  played  by  exogenous  fac-
ors  in  the  evolution  of  the  borrowing  cost  faced  by  emerging
conomies.  This  is  in  line  with  Garcia-Herrero  and  Ortiz
2005)  conclusions  on  the  inﬂuence  of  global  risk  aversion
n  Latin  American  sovereign  spreads.
Remolona  et  al.  (2007)  analyze  the  components  of
overeign  CDS  spreads,  decomposing  the  expected  loss  from
efault  and  the  risk  premium.  They  ﬁnd  that  risk  premia
ccount  for  much  of  the  spread  (ranging  from  two-thirds  to
our-ﬁfths  of  the  change  in  the  spread).
They  also  estimate  the  determinants  of  sovereign  default
isk  using  the  rating-implied  probability  of  default  for  a
ample  of  emerging  countries,  on  which  they  run  a  panel
egression  with  ﬁxed  effects,  using  annual  data  from  1990
o  2005.  They  ﬁnd  a  signiﬁcant  relationship  with  country
ize,  inﬂation,  development,  the  current  account  deﬁcit,
nd  external  debt.  These  results  hold  when  considering  debt
ntolerance,  original  sin  and  currency  mismatch.  In  their
ramework,  country  fundamentals  do  improve  access  to  for-
ign  ﬁnancing.
There  are  other  areas  of  study  that  can  be  mentioned.
he  ﬁrst  is  on  the  determinants  and  dynamics  of  other
easures  of  sovereign  creditworthiness  such  as  ‘‘distance
o  default’’,  sovereign  credit  ratings,  and  probabilities  of
efault,  analyzed  by  Rowland  and  Torres  (2004)  or  Weigel
nd  Gemmill  (2006). Second,  the  strand  of  the  literature
hat  studies  the  relationship  between  sovereign  spreads
nd  currency  risk  (Domowitz  et  al.,  2001;  Ahumada  and
aregnani,  2005;  Powell  and  Sturzenegger,  2000;  Philippon
t  al.,  2001).  Third,  the  pass-through  from  US  interest  rates
o  emerging  market  spreads  (Frankel,  1999;  Frankel  and
ose,  2000;  Kamin  and  Von  Kleist,  1999).
.7.3.  Spreads  in  the  euro  area
hile  the  main  issue  studied  before  the  existence  of  the
uro  was  the  spreads  in  emerging  countries,  the  creation
f  the  single  currency,  and  in  particular,  the  sovereign
ebt  crisis,  led  to  an  increase  in  the  academic  interest
n  sovereign  spreads  in  the  European  Economic  and  Mone-
ary  Union  (EMU).  The  setup  is  similar  to  that  used  previously
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or  emerging  economies,  where  the  determinants  used  are
ountry-speciﬁc  risk  factors,  global  risk  aversion  conditions
nd  ﬁnancial  market-speciﬁc  issues,  like  liquidity.
Some  authors  ﬁnd  a  relevant  role  for  monetary  policy
n  risk  aversion  and  spreads.  Maltritz  (2012)  considers  the
ffect  of  openness  and  the  terms  of  trade.
For  example,  Attinasi  et  al.  (2009)  ﬁnd  a  role  for  bank
escue  packages  and  the  ensuing  shifting  of  risk  from  the
rivate  sector  to  the  public  sector  has  played  a  key  role.
owever,  the  elasticity  of  credit  premia  to  ﬁscal  fundamen-
als  (a  measure  of  the  price  of  credit  risk)  also  increased
uring  the  crisis,  partly  owing  to  an  increase  in  the  degree
f  global  risk  aversion.  Gerlach  et  al.  (2010)  ﬁnd  that  global
isk  interacts  with  country  speciﬁc  fundamentals.  This  inter-
ction  and  its  impact  on  spread  changes  over  time.
.7.4.  The  impact  of  liquidity
he  last  broad  category  of  determinants  of  sovereign  bond
preads  relates  to  liquidity  conditions  in  bond  markets,  usu-
lly  proxied  by  overall  outstanding  amount  of  public  debt,
id-ask  spreads  and  trading  volumes.
Beber  et  al.  (2009)  ﬁnd  that  credit  premia  are  generally
ore  relevant  than  liquidity  premia  for  euro  area  sovereign
onds  but,  in  moments  of  heightened  market  uncertainty,
iquidity  considerations  may  prevail.
.7.5.  The  euro  area
uro  area  sovereign  bond  markets  initially  attracted  atten-
ion  from  academia  as  a  way  to  assess  whether  the  adoption
f  the  single  currency  was  leading  to  increased  ﬁnancial
ntegration,  as  studied  by  Baele  et  al.  (2004),  or  Gómez-Puig
2006,  2008).  In  these  ﬁrst  studies,  the  standard  deﬁnition  of
overeign  risk  included  its  two  main  domestic  components,
arket  liquidity  and  credit  risk,  and  an  international  risk
actor,  which  reﬂected  investors’  risk  aversion.  Some  of  the
esearch  then  focused  on  systemic  versus  idiosyncratic  risk.
eyer  (2004)  and  Pagano  and  Von  Thadden  (2004)  stressed
he  importance  of  systemic  risk  in  the  behavior  of  yield  dif-
erentials  in  EMU  countries,  while  others  showed  that  the
diosyncratic  risk  component  in  the  movements  of  spreads
as  generally  more  important  than  the  systemic  risk,  as
hown  in  Gómez-Puig  (2009),  Dötz  and  Fischer  (2010)  and
avero  and  Missale  (2012).  Some  studies  suggested  that  co-
ovements  across  the  Eurozone  were  a  key  determinant
Abad  et  al.,  2010).
However,  the  sovereign  debt  crisis  in  Europe,  which
egan  in  late  2009,  has  revived  the  literature  on  euro
rea  sovereign  spread  drivers  and  attributed  increasing
mportance  to  uncertainty  and  variables  reﬂecting  country-
peciﬁc  conﬁdence  and  indicators  of  real  activity  (see  e.g.
eorgoutsos  and  Migiakis,  2013).  Favero  and  Missale  (2012)
nd  that  credit  risk  has  increased  in  importance  as  a  deter-
inant  of  sovereign  bond  spreads.  Similar  arguments  can  be
ound  in  other  recent  studies  using  data  that  extend  beyond
he  crisis  period  such  as  Palladini  and  Portes  (2011)  or  Beirne
nd  Fratzscher  (2013).
Many  authors  have  stressed  the  importance  of  other  fun-
amentals  beyond  the  country’s  ﬁscal  position  to  explain
ield  spread  behavior  after  the  outbreak  of  the  crisis,  as
xpressed  in  Mody  (2009),  Barrios  et  al.  (2009),  Bolton  and
eanne  (2011)  and  Allen  et  al.  (2011).  Some  studies  have
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ooked  at  the  dynamic  properties  of  sovereign  spreads  over
ime,  testing  whether  there  was  a  change  in  behavior  dur-
ng  the  crisis,  as  Pozzi  and  Wolswijk  (2008),  Gerlach  et  al.
2010), Aßmann  and  Boysen-Hogrefe  (2012)  and  Bernoth  and
rdogan  (2012).
Sgherri  and  Zoli  (2009)  ﬁnd  that  euro  area  sovereign  risk
remium  differentials  are  mainly  driven  by  a common  fac-
or,  in  line  with  the  ﬁnding  on  the  importance  of  global  risk
version.  They  do  however  highlight  a  change  starting  in
ctober  2008,  with  markets  becoming  progressively  more
oncerned  about  the  ﬁscal  stability  of  countries  and  in  par-
icular,  reacting  to  the  impact  of  the  contingent  liabilities
rising  from  problems  in  the  national  banking  sectors.
Gómez-Puig  et  al.  (2014)  similarly  show  that  the  rise
n  sovereign  risk  in  central  countries  can  only  be  partially
xplained  by  the  evolution  of  local  macro-economic  varia-
les  in  those  countries.  They  ﬁnd  that  the  importance  of
lobal  variables  increased  in  this  period.
So  the  ﬁscal  balance  may  be  important,  but  is  not  the
nly  factor  that  can  lead  to  ﬁnancial  stress,  as  shown  in
articular  by  recent  research.  In  this  context,  the  behavior
f  banks  during  periods  of  sovereign  stress  plays  a  central
ole  in  the  propagation  of  the  latter  and  as  such  has  been
tudied  amply  by  the  literature.
. The dynamics of ﬁnancial crises
 key  area  of  study  is  how  such  crises  unfold.  While  the  ﬁrst
eneration  of  the  literature  emphasized  the  role  played  by
overeign  debt  sustainability,  later  on,  triggered  particularly
y  the  Asian  crisis  in  the  late  90s,  a  large  body  of  the  lit-
rature  has  been  devoted  to  analyze  market  panic  and  the
ehavior  of  ﬁnancial  institutions  in  this  context.
Some  authors  (Radelet  et  al.,  1998)  emphasize  the  role  of
nancial  panic  as  an  essential  element  of  the  Asian  crisis.  At
he  core  of  the  crisis  were  bubble-like  large  foreign  capital
nﬂows  into  ﬁnancial  systems  without  the  necessary  regula-
ory  and  supervisory  tools  to  manage  them  and  so  became
ulnerable  to  panic.
In  a  similar  vein,  some  authors  have  explained  ﬁnan-
ial  crises  through  the  Minsky  (Arestis  and  Glickman,  2002)
xplanation  of  instability  inherent  to  the  ﬁnancial  sec-
or.  This  view  is  supported  by  the  ﬁnding  that  threats  to
rowth  and  employment  from  the  ﬁnancial  sector  are  much
ntensiﬁed  in  open,  liberalized  and,  especially,  developing
conomies.
When  ﬁnancial  crises  unfold,  ﬁnancial  sector  vulnera-
ility  and  sovereign  debt  vulnerability  may  reinforce  each
ther.  Some  authors  have  emphasized  how  not  having  your
wn  monetary  policy  can  lead  to  more  fragile  bond  markets.
n  particular,  De  Grauwe  and  Ji  (2013)  show  that  part  of  the
ise  in  sovereign  bond  spreads  was  not  related  to  funda-
entals.  Secondly,  some  fundamentals,  like  sovereign  debt,
gnored  before  the  crises,  became  signiﬁcant  during  the  cri-
is.  However,  this  is  a  usual  ﬁnding  even  for  countries  with
heir  own  central  bank,  as  shown  above.
De  Grauwe  and  Ji  (2013)  compare  that  analysis  with  that
f  countries  that  had  their  own  currency  but  similar  fun-
amentals  in  terms  of  debt  and  ﬁscal  space  as  Eurozone
ountries.  In  these  countries,  however,  they  do  not  ﬁnd
vidence  of  heightened  signiﬁcance  of  ﬁscal  fundamentals.
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Therefore,  this  may  be  a  sign  that,  indeed,  markets  were
priced  in  the  absence  of  a  lender  of  last  resort;  in  the  pres-
ence  of  such  a  lender,  one  would  expect  the  capital  outﬂow
to  have  materialized  in  other  aspects,  like  a  further  currency
depreciation,  which  in  turn  could  have  more  expansionary
effects  that  the  rise  in  yields.
3.1.  Interactions  between  banks  and  sovereigns
The  interactions  of  banks  and  sovereigns  were  ﬁrst  studied
in  the  context  of  defaults  by  developing  countries.  Some
authors  have  modeled  debt  rescheduling  as  a  game  where
the  two  players  are  the  banks  and  the  sovereign.  In  Bulow
and  Rogoff  (1989),  debt  rescheduling  arises  as  the  result  of
bank  impatience  because  the  lost  present  value  of  their
investments  undermines  their  solvency  and  compromises
their  future,  thus  makes  them  willing  to  accept  haircuts  on
debt  payments.  In  this  setting,  strategic  default  arises  natu-
rally  out  of  ﬁnancial  sector  weakness  and  the  corresponding
lack  of  bargaining  power  by  banks.
3.2.  Banking  and  ﬁscal  crisis
Reinhart  and  Rogoff  (2009,  2011)  ﬁnd  that  ﬁnancial  crises  are
followed  by  ﬁscal  crises.  They  conclude  that  sovereign  debt
ratios  typically  rise  after  a  banking  crisis.  However,  their  use
of  annual  data  may  hide  more  subtle  interactions  amongst
the  variables,  as  the  interaction  between  banking  risk  and
sovereign  risk  may  take  place  within  a  year,  and  may  change
shape  in  that  year.
In  their  setting,  the  rise  in  sovereign  debt  is  not  primarily
due  to  the  cost  of  rescuing  the  ﬁnancial  system,  but  the
slower  growth  after  a  ﬁnancial  crisis  leads  to  a  rapid  rise  in
the  public  debt  ratios.  The  fact  that  slower  growth  follows
ﬁnancial  crises  has  been  documented  by  Abiad  et  al.  (2011);
low  growth  stems  for  the  scarcity  of  credit  which  typically
follows  banking  crises.
The  approach  of  Acharya  (2009)  is  slightly  different;  he
considers  slow  growth  as  the  result  of  a  credit  boom  pre  cri-
sis,  which  masked  the  underlying  low  potential  growth.  Also,
their  use  of  annual  data  could  explain  the  fact  that  they  do
not  ﬁnd  a  feedback  loop  from  public  debt  to  banking  crises.
This  may  downplay  the  effect  that  bank  bailouts  and  the  sub-
sequent  rise  of  public  debt  can  have  on  the  reinforcement
of  bank  and  sovereign  weaknesses.
At  the  core  of  this  literature  lie  the  links  between  the
ﬁnancial  sector  and  ﬁscal  sustainability.  The  relationship
between  both  has  been  extensively  documented  by  Reihart
and  Rogoff.  However,  somewhat  contrary  to  Reinhart  and
Rogoff  (2009,  2011),  the  results  of  Mohanty  and  Scatigna
(2005)  show  that  it  is  not  just  public  debt  that  causes  a
ﬁnancial  crisis.  Rather,  large  private  debt  and  a  deteriora-
tion  of  the  credit  quality  of  the  sovereign  can  also  cause  the
ﬁnancial  panic.
3.3.  Sovereign  bank  feedback  loopsThe  characterization  of  sovereign  bank  feedback  loops  has
been  studied  by  a  large  literature.  The  evidence  on  the  links
is  quite  varied.
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Thukral  (2013)  uses  a  panel  to  study  the  role  of  ﬁnan-
ial  sector  variables  on  the  determination  of  sovereign  CDS
preads,  and  the  results  trigger  his  conclusion  that  there
s  bank  dominance  of  sovereign  ﬁnancing  conditions.  Mody
nd  Sandri  (2012),  using  sub-periods  similar  to  those  in
charya  and  Steffen  (2015),  ﬁnd  that  the  feedback  between
overeign  and  bank  risk  changed.  Instead  of  comparing  CDS
preads,  Mody  and  Sandri  (2012)  use  sovereign  spreads  as  the
anifestation  of  sovereign  ﬁscal  risk,  and  the  level  of  stock
arket  capitalization  of  banks  as  a  measure  of  banking  sys-
em  risk.  They  show  that  the  euro  crisis  traces  back  to  the
ear  Stearns  crisis.  As  bailouts  of  banks  began  to  be  priced  in
he  market,  sovereign  spreads  started  to  reﬂect  higher  ﬁs-
al  solvency  risk,  especially  in  countries  where  growth  was
xpected  to  slow  down  and  had,  as  a  starting  point,  high
ebt  levels.
According  to  Honohan  (2008),  the  link  between  banking
risis  and  sovereign  risk  may  arise  from  the  slowdown  and
he  credit  shortage  that  usually  follows  a  banking  crisis.  Such
vents  tend  to  be  long  crises  (lasting  2.5  years  on  average),
nd  lead  to  sharp  rises  in  public  debt.  The  authors  estimate
hat  the  median  ﬁscal  cost  of  a banking  crisis  stands  at  15.5%
f  GDP.
Kollmann  and  Roeger  (2012)  also  study  the  macro-
conomic  effect  of  ﬁnancial  sector  rescues.  They  ﬁnd  that
ank  rescue  operations  can  help  cut  short  a  ﬁnancial  crisis
nd  improve  macro-economic  performance.  A  key  avenue
f  the  recovery  is  that  bank  bailouts  can  help  investment
ecover,  consistent  with  Broner  et  al.  (2014)  or  Popov  and
an  Horen  (2014).  However,  they  ﬁnd  evidence  of  a  nega-
ive  impact,  as  sovereign  debt  purchases  by  banks  lead  to
 crowding  out  of  private  investment.  In  contrast,  Gray  and
obst  (2011)  show  the  potentially  high  impact  on  ﬁscal  risk
ssociated  to  the  existence  of  contingent  liabilities.
A  key  transmission  mechanism  is  that  domestic  banks
end  to  be  particularly  vulnerable  to  restructuring.  Noyer
2010)  argues  that  by  holding  non-performing  government
onds,  capital  could  be  compromised  and  so  threaten  the
olvency  of  weaker  and  more  exposed  institutions.
Erce  (2013)  suggests  that  the  degree  of  bank  interme-
iation  and  the  banking  system  exposure  to  the  sovereign
trongly  inﬂuence  a  debt  crisis  ripple  effect  on  the  real  econ-
my.  In  addition,  the  moral  suasion  of  authorities  may  lead
o  excessive  holdings  of  sovereign  debt  by  domestic  creditors
t  below  market  yields  (Díaz-Cassou  et  al.,  2008).  While  this
elps  the  government  keep  ﬁnancing  conditions  more  favor-
ble,  a  government  default  in  this  context  would  trigger  a
anking  crisis.
There  are  other  channels  by  which  sovereign  stress  leads
o  banking  stress,  although  many  papers  emphasize  the
ole  played  by  the  holdings  of  sovereign  debt  by  banks.
n  Darracq  Pariès  et  al.  (2014), the  positive  connection
etween  sovereign  and  bank  risk  is  due  to  banks  investing  in
overnment  securities.  Along  these  lines,  Angeloni  and  Wolff
2012)  assess  the  impact  of  sovereign  bond  holdings  on  the
erformance  of  banks  during  the  euro  area  crisis  using  indi-
idual  bank  data  and  sovereign  bond  holdings.  They  ﬁnd  that
eripheral  sovereign  bonds  affect  banks’  stock  market  val-
ations  heterogeneously.  While  Italian,  Irish  and  Greek  debt
ppear  to  have  negatively  affected  the  market  valuation  of
he  banks  holding  them,  such  an  effect  is  not  signiﬁcant
or  other  peripheral  sovereign  debt  of  countries  like  Spain,
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uggesting  that  the  speciﬁc  characteristics  of  the  banking
ector  (like  its  international  presence)  may  also  play  a  role.
Acharya  et  al.  (2012)  document  the  high  exposure  of  their
ample  banks  to  their  own  sovereign,  which  according  to
heir  theory  should  be  a  main  channel  through  which  stress
eeds  back  from  the  sovereign  to  banks.
Popov  and  Van  Horen  (2014)  focus  on  the  feedback  from
overeign  risk  into  banking  risk  by  assessing  the  extent  to
hich  holdings  of  sovereign  bonds  detract  the  resources
vailable  for  lending  to  the  private  sector.  This  channel
nhances  the  feedback  loop  by  limiting  growth  and  so
urther  weakening  the  health  of  the  sovereign.  They  ﬁnd
vidence  that  this  was  particularly  relevant  in  the  periphery.
Finally,  sovereign  rating  downgrades  further  limit  banks’
ccess  to  foreign  ﬁnancing,  leading  to  sudden  stops  or  higher
orrowing  costs  (Reinhart  and  Rogoff,  2011).
Bank  for  International  Settlements  (2010)  shows  four
ain  channels  through  which  a  deterioration  in  the  cred-
tworthiness  of  a  sovereign  can  pass  through  to  the  banking
ystem.  One  channel  of  transmission  is  banks’  holdings  of
overeign  government  debt.  Second,  higher  sovereign  risk
educes  the  value  of  collateral  that  domestic  banks  can
e  used  for  funding.  Third,  sovereign  downgrades  normally
ranslate  into  lower  ratings  for  banks  located  in  the  down-
raded  country.  Lastly,  increased  sovereign  risk  reduces  the
alue  of  the  implicit/explicit  government  guarantees  to
anks.
Mody  and  Sandri  (2012)  show  that  sovereign  spreads  are
ffected  by  the  domestic  vulnerabilities  of  national  banking
ectors.  Fiscal  fundamentals  can  worsen  the  loop;  the  rela-
ionship  seems  stronger  for  countries  showing  large  public
ebt.
Similarly,  Pisani-Ferry  (2012)  shows  that  one  reason  that
overeigns  may  be  sensitive  to  the  domestic  banking  sector
s  that  the  sector’s  size  has  become  large  relative  to  tax
evenues.  As  a  result,  small  problems  in  the  banking  system
an  become  an  issue  for  government  solvency.
In  periods  of  ﬁnancial  crisis,  the  implicit  public  guar-
ntee  on  bank  solvency  is  likely  to  become  effective,  so
arkets  may  price  in  this  higher  probability  of  payout  by  the
overeign  (Gray  and  Jobst,  2011;  Gerlach  et  al.,  2010;  Pisani-
erry,  2012),  thus  enhancing  the  link  between  the  sovereign
nd  banks.
Reinhart  and  Rogoff  (2009)  show  that  historically  public
ebt-to-GDP  ratios  are  higher  following  a  country’s  bank-
ng  crisis.  The  deterioration  of  sovereign  creditworthiness
s,  however,  only  partly  due  to  the  cost  of  rescuing  trou-
led  banks.  The  main  explanation  is  the  economic  slowdown
aused  by  the  banking  crisis
Merler  and  Pisani-Ferry  (2012),  for  example,  establish
hat  the  rise  in  domestic  government  debt  raise  the  poten-
ial  for  negative  feedback  loops  between  sovereign  and
anking  stress.  Mody  and  Sandri  (2012)  show  that  the
upposed  link  between  holdings  of  sovereign  debt  and
anks’  market  valuations  was  not  signiﬁcant  in  the  period
uly--October  2011  in  Italy,  Spain,  Portugal  and  Ireland.  Only
 clear  relationship  between  Greek  holdings  and  bank  mar-
et  valuation  was  established.Arghyrou  and  Tsoukalas  (2010)  posit  that  the  mechanics  of
he  EMU  debt  crisis  are  similar  to  those  of  a  currency  crisis:
n  this  case,  the  systemic  risk  that  would  be  seen  in  currency
arkets  is  diverted  into  the  markets  for  sovereign  bonds.  As
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 result,  sovereign  bond  spreads  can  be  taken  as  an  indica-
ion  of  stress  that  would  eventually  lead  to  abandonment  of
he  currency  regime.
Illing  and  König  (2014)  show  that  the  absence  of  lender
f  last  resort  (LLR)  can  lead  to  self-fulﬁlling  crises  even
hen  fundamentals  are  good.  The  perceived  weakness  of
he  sovereign  can  lead  to  a  deterioration  of  the  quality
f  the  guarantee  that  it  has  given  banks  and  so  would  justify
he  transfer  of  risk  from  the  sovereign  to  banks.
The  dynamics  presented  by  the  literature  suggest  that
he  absence  of  a central  bank  that  is  willing  to  act  as  a  lender
f  last  resort  increases  the  likelihood,  in  stress,  of  sovereign
efaults.  In  turn,  the  perceived  lack  of  ﬁscal  muscle  leads
nvestors  to  price  in  a  bank  default.  While  sovereign  bond
oldings  may  reinforce  this  loop,  the  transmission  of  stress
an  exist  even  if  there  are  no  sovereign  bond  holdings  by  the
omestic  banking  sector.
.4.  Regulation  and  the  sovereign  bank  nexus
anking  regulation  has  been  blamed  partially  for  reinforcing
he  bank-sovereign  feedback  loop.  As  is  explained  in  chap-
er  3,  bank  holdings  of  sovereign  debt  are  generally  not
ubject  to  a  risk  weight  in  banks’  capital  requirement
atio.
To the  extent  that  sovereign  debt’s  riskiness  arises  from
he  expansionary  bias  in  ﬁscal  policy  over  the  business  cycle,
t  can  be  avoided  through  more  responsible  ﬁscal  policy  in
he  upturn,  as  described  in  Breton  et  al.  (2012).  A  source
f  instability  in  the  ﬁnancial  sector  can  be  the  fact  that
ublic  debt  is  perceived  as  not  being  sustainable,  which  can
ead  to  a  sell  off  and  a  resulting  vicious  cycle  (Acharya  and
teffen,  2015;  Merler  and  Pisani-Ferry,  2012).  This  has  been  a
articular  concern  recently,  when  the  recent  developments
n  the  Eurozone  crisis  questioned  the  Reinhart  and  Rogoff
2009)  concept  of  graduation  from  serial  default.
The  sovereign  stress  has  led  to  a  number  of  propo-
als  to  change  the  regulatory  treatment  of  sovereign  debt;
announ  (2012)  argues  that  highly  rated  sovereign  assets
hould  receive  a  treatment  consistent  with  their  low  risk.
his  would  entail  a  differentiation  amongst  the  different
overeign  assets  according  to  their  creditworthiness.
However,  instead  of  doing  away  with  the  Basel  stan-
ards  that  use  the  0  risk  weight  on  domestic  debt  holdings,
announ  (2012)  calls  for  the  introduction  of  enhanced  super-
ision  of  sovereign  risk  through  instruments  like  further  and
tricter  stress  tests.
Praet  (2013)  highlighted  that  a  regulation  that  treats
anks’  holdings  of  sovereign  debt  according  to  the  risk  they
ose  to  banks’  capital  will  prevent  said  banks  from  exces-
ive  use  of  central  bank  liquidity,  which,  in  a  currency
nion,  according  to  Uhlig  (2014),  can  lead  to  perverse  incen-
ives.  Weidmann  (2013)  suggests  that  by  biasing  the  demand
oward  sovereign  bonds,  the  regulation  distorts  the  relative
rices  of  assets  signaled  by  interest  rates.  However,  others
ave  considered  that  some  shortcomings  of  the  introduction
f  a risk  weight  on  sovereign  exposures,  such  as  the  pro-
yclicality  associated  with  capital  requirement  ratios,  call
or  a  different  treatment  of  sovereign  exposures.  In  par-
icular,  Nouy  (2012)  considers  using  a  Pillar  II  approach  to
xtend  sovereign  risk,  along  the  lines  of  Hannoun  (2012),
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not  least  because  the  pro-cyclicality  of  capital  regulation
can  be  especially  problematic  for  sovereign  bonds.
A  key  concern  on  this  treatment  is  that  the  0  risk  weight
has  provided  additional  incentive  to  the  exploitation  of  the
carry  trade  (Acharya  and  Steffen,  2015).  The  absence  of  a
capital  requirement  lowered  incentives  to  lend  to  the  real
economy,  particularly  amongst  the  low-capitalized  banks.
As  a  result,  the  zero  risk  weight  lets  zombie  banks  continue
operating,  detracts  resources  from  the  economy  and  leads
to  perverse  incentives  in  a  currency  union.
In  this  vein,  Blundell-Wignall  (2012)  considers  that  the
key  may  lie  in  the  series  of  ﬁscal  and  structural  policy
measures  being  followed  in  the  EU  and  aimed  at  tackling
the  underlying  weaknesses  of  sovereign  bond  credit  quality,
which  would  eliminate  the  riskiness  of  those  holdings  and  so
the  need  for  increasing  its  risk  weight.  The  measures  include
credible  ﬁscal  consolidation  plans,  the  enhancement  of  the
European  Central  Bank  (ECB)’s  role  as  liquidity  provider  of
last  resort,  and  the  creation  of  effective  backstops.
Of  course,  the  ﬁndings  of  the  literature  on  ﬁscal  fatigue
and  ﬁscal  sustainability  are  particularly  important  to  this
end.  As  such,  countries  that  present  the  ﬁscal,  institutional
and  growth  strategies  that  allow  them  to  avert  ﬁscal  fatigue
can  have  a  virtuous  cycle  by  which  their  debt  can  safely  be
considered  a  risk-free  asset,  relieving  the  balance  sheet  of
domestic  banks  and  allowing  public  debt  to  play  its  role  as
a  safe  asset  in  times  of  distress.
The  need  for  a  safe  asset  is  inherent  to  the  workings  of
a  ﬁnancial  system.  As  Nakaso  (2013)  showed,  this  impact
can  be  seen  through  several  avenues;  for  instance,  sovereign
bonds  act  as  a  benchmark  for  other  assets,  as  mentioned  by
Dunne  et  al.  (2007),  thus  used  as  a  reference  rate  from  which
the  additional  risk  factors  are  compounded  to  determine  the
price  of  other  assets.  By  serving  as  a  safe  and  stable  source  of
collateral  in  ﬁnancial  transactions,  attracting  lower  haircuts
and  margin  requirements,  they  allow  markets  to  function
smoothly  (Giovannini  et  al.,  2015).
Their  role  as  an  accepted  source  of  collateral  allows
sovereign  debt  to  play  a  similar  role  to  that  of  ﬁat  money  in
economies  (Singh,  2013).  In  this  way,  sovereign  debt  posted
as  collateral  can  be  used  in  other  transactions,  creating  an
effect  which  is  similar  to  the  monetary  multiplier  effect
(Singh,  2013).  Without  an  accepted,  liquid,  risk  free  asset,
some  ﬁnancial  transactions  that  require  the  use  of  collateral
may  never  happen.
3.5.  Connectedness:  amongst  ﬁnancial  ﬁrms
and with  sovereigns
Finally,  and  as  expected,  given  its  key  role  in  the  work  of
ﬁnancial  markets,  safe  assets  are  also  integral  to  prudential
regulation.  Prudential  requirements  use  safe  assets  in  order
to  limit  or  prevent  excessive  risk  taking  in  normal  times.  One
can  think  that  to  the  extent  that  both  sovereign  debt  and
money  are  backed  by  a  country’s  central  bank,  they  should
be  exchangeable  assets.  Debt  only  becomes  risky  when  a
country  stops  being  backed  by  its  central  bank.Given  the  importance  of  ﬁnancial  stress,  many  resources
have  been  devoted  to  understanding  the  workings  of  this
event.  A  key  area  of  analysis  is  how  stress  can  propa-
gate  from  one  ﬁnancial  institution  to  the  system,  or  to
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ther  institutions,  or  from  the  sovereign  to  ﬁnancial  sys-
em  and  vice  versa.  This  played  a key  role  in  the  start  of
he  global  ﬁnancial  crisis  in  2008--2009;  understanding  which
nstitutions  are  systemic  and  which  are  not  is  essential  to
nderstand  the  costs  and  beneﬁts  of  the  resolution  of  a  given
nstitution.
As a  result,  much  literature  and  policy  effort  has  gone
nto  determining  what  a  systemically  important  institution
s  and  how  it  should  be  dealt  with.  The  Basel  Commit-
ee  on  Banking  Supervision  (BCBS)  has  been  a  key  player.
n  order  to  enhance  the  regulation  of  SIFIs,  the  ﬁrst  step
as  to  identify  them.  To  this  end,  the  BCBS  selected  a
umber  of  indicators  as  follows  that  reﬂect  many  dimen-
ions  of  a  bank:  size,  interconnectedness,  the  lack  of
eadily  available  substitutes  for  the  services  they  provide,
heir  global  (cross-jurisdictional)  activity  and  their  com-
lexity.  The  size,  interconnectedness  and  substitutability
ategories  are  in  line  with  the  guidelines  of  the  International
onetary  Fund  (IMF)/Bank  for  International  Settlements
BIS)/Financial  Stability  Board  (FSB)  report  submitted  to  the
roup  of  Twenty  (G20)  Finance  Ministers  and  Central  Bank
overnors  (Bank  for  International  Settlements,  2010).
A  part  of  the  literature  has  analyzed  the  need  for  such  a
egulation  from  a  particular  perspective:  the  implicit  sub-
idy  in  being  too  big  to  fail.  Some  authors  ﬁnd  that  the
ubsidy  is  large  enough  to  distort  ﬁrms’  decisions,  even
eyond  the  banking  sector  (Baker  and  McArthur,  2009).
Others  (Thomson,  2009)  take  a  more  policy-oriented
pproach  and  not  only  propose  a  framework  for  identifying
nd  supervising  such  institutions,  but  they  also  attempt  to
emove  the  advantages  from  being  systemically  important
nancial  institutions  (SIFIs)  and  the  perverse  incentives  that
ay  arise.  Size  and  interconnectedness  would  be  the  basic
eterminants  for  being  considered  a  SIFI,  and  ﬁrms  that  are
uch  by  these  two  counts  would  be  subject  to  the  strictest
egulations.  In  contrast,  if  a ﬁrm  is  highly  correlated,  it
ay  not  be  subject  to  additional  capital  controls,  but  only
o  more  strict  disclosure  arrangements.  Finally,  institutions
hat  are  neither  large  nor  interconnected  or  correlated  but
ave  a  particular  impact  on  the  workings  of  a  particular
egion  would  be  subject  to  enhanced  supervision.
.  Macro-prudential policy
he  recent  ﬁnancial  crisis  has  shown  the  need  for  new
nstruments  to  deal  with  the  global  build-up  of  ﬁnancial
mbalances,  which  can  eventually  have  severe  macro-
conomic  consequences.  In  particular,  a  major  shortcoming
n  the  run  up  to  the  crisis  was  the  lack  of  understanding
n  how  systemic  risk  builds  up  even  when,  from  a  micro-
rudential  perspective,  the  risks  to  the  ﬁnancial  system  may
eem,  ex  ante,  limited.
This  lack  of  understanding  was  in  part  due  to  the  conﬁ-
ence  that  the  ﬁnancial  system  would  be  able  to  adjust  itself
utomatically.  As  a  result,  growing  debt  and  leverage  before
he  crisis,  often  related  to  house  price  booms,  were  not
ackled.  As  a  result,  low  volatility  and  risk  premia  and  the
xcessive  risk  taking  they  could  entail  were  not  considered
s  large  a  risk  to  the  system  as  they  turned  out  to  be.  In
his  context,  the  role  of  ﬁnancial  innovation,  deregulation
nd  disintermediation  in  the  creation  of  bubbles  was  not
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ufﬁciently  recognized.  In  particular,  the  avenues  through
hich  the  fallout  from  the  bubble  would  spread  were  not
dentiﬁed.
The  need  to  understand  how  interactions  across  ﬁrms
evelop  means  there  is  a  need  to  complement  the  tradi-
ional,  micro-approach  with  a  macro-approach  in  regulation
nd  surveillance.  This  need  for  a  macro-prudential  approach
as  led  to  several  policy  initiatives  to  implement  macro-
rudential  policies  (see  Gorton  and  Winton,  2003).
The  policy  debate  is,  as  a  result,  evolving  around  the
ange  of  macro-prudential  tools  available,  how  they  can  be
mplemented  and  their  effectiveness.  The  effectiveness  has
een  analyzed  both  in  terms  of  the  economic  impact  of
he  new  tools  and  the  interactions  with  other  policies,  in
articular  monetary  policy.
A  key  issue  is  the  interaction  between  monetary  policy
nd  other  prudential  policies.  In  particular,  part  of  the  rea-
oning  focuses  on  the  impact  of  monetary  policy  on  ﬁnancial
tability,  and  so,  the  role  that  may  be  played  by  macro-
rudential  policy  as  a  complement  to  monetary  policy.  These
nteractions  are  not  well  understood,  on  account  of  the  still
ascent  knowledge  regarding  interactions  between  the  real
conomy  and  the  ﬁnancial  system.  Macro-prudential  policy
nd  the  related  literature  can  be  seen  as  an  attempt  to
ridge  that  gap.
Borio  (2009)  shows  that  the  term  was  used  to  empha-
ize  the  links  between  ﬁnancial  regulation  and  supervision
nd  the  economic  status  quo.  Tucker  (2009)  and  McCauley
t  al.  (1999)  also  show  the  purpose  of  macro-prudential  pol-
cy  when  it  started,  and,  in  particular,  its  focus  on  managing
he  risks  that  arise  from  an  increase  in  leverage.
In  Bank  for  International  Settlements  (1986),  one  can  ﬁnd
eferences  to  the  effect  of  regulation  on  the  aggregate  pay-
ents  system  and  the  ﬁnancial  system.  This  was  followed  by
he  insight  that  what  appear  as  prudent  from  an  individual
erspective  may  be  dangerous  from  a  systemic  perspective
Blunden,  2007).
However,  the  focus  on  macro-prudential  issues  has  rock-
ted  after  the  current  crisis,  as  can  be  seen  in  the  references
o  the  issue  coming  from  policymakers  (e.g.  Shirakawa,
009;  Nijathaworn,  2009;  Tumpel-Gugerell,  2009;  Bini
maghi,  2009;  Kohn,  2009;  Brouwer,  2010).  Some  of  the
ssues,  in  particular  regarding  the  interaction  of  pruden-
ial  policy  and  monetary  policy,  can  be  traced  back  to  Borio
t  al.  (2003),  as  acknowledged  by  Orphanides  and  Williams
2012).
The  emergence  of  the  macro-prudential  debate  came  at  a
ime  when  the  academic  literature  seemed  to  have  reached
n  agreement  on  what  the  target  of  monetary  policy  should
e.  The  key  target  for  central  banks  should  be  price  stabil-
ty  over  the  medium  term.  In  some  cases,  central  banks  had
 dual  mandate,  such  as  for  example  the  Federal  Reserve,
nd  maximum  sustainable  employment.  Given  these  targets,
perative  objectives  were  typically  deﬁned  in  terms  of  CPI
nﬂation  or  some  other  measure  of  underlying  price  dynam-
cs.
As  of  now,  there  is  still  little  agreement  on  what  the  tar-
et  of  macro-prudential  policy  should  be.  Financial  stability
s  seen  as  a  key  target,  but  an  operational  deﬁnition  of  it
emains  elusive.  There  are  two  main  camps  on  this  matter:
irst,  those  that  deﬁne  ﬁnancial  stability  as  the  resilience
f  the  ﬁnancial  system  when  faced  with  exogenous  shocks
a
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e.g.  Allen  and  Wood,  2006;  Padoa-Schioppa,  2003).  Second,
hose  who  think  that  ﬁnancial  distress  can  be  endogenous
nd  so  consider  that  the  essence  of  ﬁnancial  stability  lies
n  the  ability  to  manage  the  imbalances  within  the  system
e.g.  Schinasi,  2004) or  how  those  imbalances  can  make
he  system  vulnerable  even  in  the  face  of  relatively  usual
hocks  (Borio  and  Drehmann,  2009).  At  the  heart  of  the
ebate  lies  on  whether  policymakers  should  prioritize  ex-
nte  supervision  and  regulation  or  ex-post  resolution  and
risis  management  policies.
Regarding  the  speciﬁc  targets  of  macro-prudential  policy,
runnermeier  and  Pedersen  (2009)  suggest  that  it  acts  to
imit  the  ﬁnancial  system’s  tendency  to  infraestimate  risk  in
he  downturn  and  overestimate  it  in  the  upturn.  By  leveling
he  measurement  of  risk  through  the  business  cycle,  regula-
ion  and  policy  may  limit  the  magnitude  of  booms  and  busts.
ank  of  England  (2009)  shares  this  view  and  highlights  that
n  avoiding  such  boom  bust  cycles,  it  will  help  the  ﬁnancial
ystem  provide  services  to  the  economy.  As  a  result,  if  the
oom  bust  cycle  is  not  related  to  the  provision  of  ﬁnancial
ervices  and  the  supply  of  credit,  it  would  be  beyond  the
cope  of  macro-prudential  policy.  Landau  (2009),  however,
sserts  that  in  practical  terms  it  would  probably  be  appro-
riate  for  macro-prudential  policies  to  take  into  account  the
reation  of  bubbles.
Borio  and  Drehmann  (2009)  contend  that  the  main  role
f  macro-prudential  policy  is  to  limit  the  materialization
f  system-wide  risk  that  can  have  a  signiﬁcant  macro-
conomic  cost.  Table  2.1  lists  the  differences  between
acro-prudential  and  micro-prudential  perspectives  sug-
ested  by  Borio  (2004).
From  a more  theoretical  perspective,  Perotti  and  Suarez
2009)  consider  that  macro-prudential  policy  should  tackle
egative  externalities  of  individual  banks  on  the  ﬁnancial
ystem:  strategies  that  may  be  optimal  from  a  bank’s  individ-
al  perspective  may  end  up  being  detrimental  to  the  system
s  a  whole.
Hanson  et  al.  (2011)  think  macro-prudential  policy  can
omplement  micro-prudential  policies,  whose  aim  is  to  pro-
ect  depositors  by  having  banks  internalize  the  losses  they
ay  incur  in  their  assets.  This  behavior  must  be  regulated
ecause  deposit  guarantee  schemes  are  subject  to  moral
azard.  Alternatively,  macro-prudential  policy  should  be
esigned  to  minimize  the  social  costs  of  a  general  decline  in
he  provision  of  banking  services.  The  manifestation  of  this
hrinkage  of  balance  sheets  can  be  found  in  credit  crunches
nd  ﬁre  sales  of  assets.
. Conclusion
he  recent  ﬁnancial  crisis  has  shed  light  on  the  importance
n  the  interactions  between  ﬁscal  stability,  ﬁnancial  sector
nd  the  policies  related.  The  intellectual  apparatus  used  to
eal  with  these  issues  remains,  in  spite  of  the  fruitful  and
ast  work  of  recent  years,  in  a  relatively  early  stage.  In  order
o  improve  it,  work  remains  to  be  done  on  different  areas:
1)  the  improved  understanding  of  the  role  of  indicators  to
ssess  systemic  risk  and  the  determinants  of  connectedness
f  ﬁnancial  institutions  and  the  sovereign;  (2)  the  channels
hrough  which  central  bank  policy  and  communication  can
ead  to  ﬁnancial  stability,  by  stabilizing  ﬁnancial  markets,
tabi
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and  the  interaction  of  the  safeguarding  of  ﬁnancial  stability
and  guaranteeing  that  the  goals  of  monetary  policy  are  met.
To  sum  up,  while  rapidly  developing,  some  aspects  of
the  literature  on  the  interaction  of  ﬁscal  and  ﬁnancial  risk
remain  in  its  early  stages.  More  research  is  needed  to  under-
stand  the  channels  of  transmission  of  stress,  the  changing
nature  of  this  interaction,  the  best  indicators  of  stress  and
the  appropriate  policy  response.
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